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1 
TRADE POLICIES IN CENTRAL ASIA AFTER EU ENLARGEMENT AND 
BEFORE RUSSIAN WTO ACCESSION: 
REGIONALISM AND INTEGRATION INTO THE WORLD ECONOMY 
 
This paper analyses the choices between regionalism and multilateralism, and the 
impact of WTO membership on the Central Asian countries.  The five Central Asian 
countries have all remained open economies with high trade/GDP ratios, despite 
adoption, especially in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, of import-substitution policies.
1  
Initially their trade was heavily oriented towards CIS markets as a result of inherited 
links and infrastructure, but by 1996 over half of their foreign trade was outside the 
old Soviet area.  This trend has continued, although for all of them Russia remains the 
single most important trade partner.  During the1990s, although many regional trade 
agreements were signed and although the Kyrgyz Republic became a World Trade 
Organization (WTO) member in 1998, the Central Asian countries vacillated between 
pursuing regional and multilateral trade policy avenues. 
In the early years of the twenty-first century the Central Asian countries’ 
relationship to the WTO became a more pressing issue.  In December 2001 China’s 
long-running WTO accession negotiations were successfully concluded.  Russian 
negotiations are also moving forward, and if they were also to be successfully 
concluded then the Central Asian countries would be in a situation in which their two 
largest neighbours were WTO members.  At the same time the push towards 
regionalism is also affected by external events such as the European Union’s deeper 
integration, symbolized by the appearance of euro banknotes in 2002, and the 
eastward expansion of the EU in 2004. 
The first section outlines the trade patterns and polices of the Central Asian 
countries since independence.  The second section describes the five countries’ WTO 
status, considers what lessons can be drawn from the Kyrgyz Republic’s WTO 
membership, and analyses the consequences for the Central Asian countries of 
Chinese and Russian WTO membership and the consequences of the current Central 
Asian applicants’ (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) own WTO accession.  
Section 3 reviews the large number of regional trade agreements which the Central 
Asian countries have signed - arrangements both among the Central Asian countries, 
and between Central Asian countries and their neighbours (Russia to the north, China 
to the east, and Iran and Turkey to the south) – and analyses why they have had little 
economic impact.  The final section draws conclusions.  
 
1. The Central Asian Countries’ Trade Patterns and Policies 
 
The five Central Asian countries’ trade patterns changed substantially over the 
1990s, although the precise magnitudes are uncertain due to the variable quality of the 
trade data.  Especially in 1992 and 1993 when the region was using a common 
currency, trade within Central Asia and with important trading partners such as Russia 
and Ukraine went largely unmonitored.  Even after the establishment of national 
currencies and of functioning national customs services, the coverage of official trade 
statistics remained far from complete.  Small-scale traders (referred to as shuttle 
traders in the region) account for a large amount of imported consumer goods and 
                                                   
1 Export/GDP ratios estimated by World Bank (2004, 9) staff with 2000 data were: Kazakhstan 59%, 
Kyrgyz Republic 42%, Tajikistan 81%, Turkmenistan 63% and Uzbekistan 25%.  
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other trade, but the recording of this trade is uneven.
2  Illegal trade is also important 
with widespread smuggling and with the Afghanistan-originating drug trade passing 
through Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic and through Turkmenistan. 
  After the major shocks of the early 1990s, according to official import and 
export data reported by the IMF (Table 1), trade recovered in the Central Asian 
countries in 1994-7.  In both the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, per capita values 
remained small and declined after a 1997 peak.  The relatively superior export 
performance of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in the mid-1990s was due in part to 
favourable energy and cotton prices, and their divergent experience after 1997 is 
partly explained by the drop in world cotton prices since 1996 and booming oil prices 
since 1999.  Turkmenistan’s exports are dominated by energy products and the 1995-
6 values are inflated by over-reporting of natural gas exports to CIS destinations 
which were not paid for (the invoice value was recorded as exports, while the 
accumulating payment arrears were recorded as foreign assets); recognizing that the 
bills would never be paid in full, Turkmenistan stopped supplying gas in March 1997, 
after which export values (and GDP) collapsed until the flow was resumed in March 
1999.
3 
Table 2 presents Islamov’s reconstruction of trade shares by destination.  The 
initial values illustrate the overwhelming orientation to former Soviet markets at the 
start of the 1990s.  By 1996 over half of the Central Asian countries’ international 
trade was with non-CIS countries (Kaser, 1997, 179).  The lead was taken by 
Uzbekistan, and reflects primarily the ability to sell cotton on world markets.
4  The 
other large country, Kazakhstan, was slower to diversify markets, unsurprisingly 
given its reliance on oil pipelines and mineral-processing links and its proximity to 
Russia, but the CIS share of Kazakhstan’s trade had fallen to half in 1997 and dropped 
substantially further in 1999 during the export boom following devaluation of the 
currency.  Only Tajikistan remains significantly dependent on CIS suppliers, and this 
largely reflects geopolitical and military considerations as unrequited imports are 
provided by Russia and Uzbekistan. 
The Central Asian countries’ tariff schedules have, in general, been fairly 
liberal (Table 3) and without great variance, although this has not been consistently 
true. The Kyrgyz Republic has bound most tariffs at ten percent as part of 
commitments made during WTO accession negotiations, and actual tariffs in 2002 
averaged half of this level.  Kazakhstan also has had a liberal trade policy since mid-
1996, when export duties were removed and the average tariff on imports fell to 
                                                   
2 Pomfret (1999, 32n) reports official estimates from Kazakhstan of shuttle trade accounting for a 
quarter of total imports in 1995, a third in 1996 and over four-fifths in 1997.  It cannot be assumed that 
official data understate trade by a constant percentage, because the share of informal trade varies across 
countries and across periods.  Uzbekistan’s vibrant bazaars and shuttle trade were brought under tighter 
state control and heavily taxed in 2000-1 ostensibly to protect consumers from shoddy imported goods, 
but whether this reduced the small traders’ activity or simply pushed it further underground is 
uncertain. 
3 Turkmenistan’s economic data are the least reliable in the CIS.  According to other sources  (reported 
in Pomfret, 2001, 158), gas exports fell from about a billion dollars in 1996 to $70 million in 1997, and 
this coincided with a poor cotton harvest due to which cotton exports fell from $332 million in 1996 to 
$84 million in 1997. 
4 Breaking non-CIS trade down by country is not very interesting, because most exports went to cotton 
exchanges in the UK or Switzerland from whence the final destination was unknown (and of little 
concern  to Uzbekistan).   Kazakhstan’s oil also becomes anonymous once it leaves the country; in 





twelve percent; the average tariff had fallen below eight percent by 2002, but there are 
recurring complaints of ad hoc impositions which make trade policy less predictable.  
Uzbekistan’s July 1995 tariff schedule had an average tariff of eighteen percent, but 
included some high rates.
5  Both Turkmenistan and Tajikistan also levy protective 
tariffs as well as imposing a range of export restrictions (mainly in the form of 
surrender requirements on foreign exchange earnings). 
Episodes of illiberal policies have involved tariffs, non-tariff barriers to trade, 
and restrictions on access to foreign exchange.  Uzbekistan in 1996 and Turkmenistan 
in 1998 responded to balance of payments difficulties by reintroducing foreign 
exchange controls, which made other import restrictions largely irrelevant.
6    
Kazakhstan suddenly raised duties on intra-Central Asian trade in response to its 1998 
crisis.
7  Border crossings have been temporarily closed, and, because such actions are 
often unpredictable, they may be discovered only upon arrival at the border.  Customs 
officials operate with considerable discretionary power, and bureaucratic 
requirements impose substantial costs (especially for importers into Uzbekistan since 
the removal of exchange controls late in 2003).  In October 1999, Kazakhstan passed 
legislation requiring labelling of all imports in both Russian and Kazakh, which could 
become a significant non-tariff barrier, although its implementation has been 
postponed.  In Tajikistan, the central government does not exert physical control over 
the entire national territory, and it has lost control over some border regions for 
lengthy periods. 
Actual collected customs duties have often been less than legislated tariffs.  In 
the initial post-independence years borders within the former Soviet Union were 
lightly policed, and goods crossed with little regulation.  In addition numerous 
preferential trading arrangements among the Central Asian countries or with 
neighbours both within and outside the former USSR have been signed, although 
these appear to have been rarely implemented (see section 3). 
In sum, with all the reservations noted in this section, the Central Asian 
countries are open economies.  The two countries with the most restrictive barriers to 
                                                   
5 Uzbekistan had applied duties of up to one hundred percent on automobiles to protect the UzDaewoo 
joint venture. 
6 The Kyrgyz Republic, in March 1995, and Kazakhstan, in July 1996, have accepted Article VIII 
commitments to the International Monetary Fund, guaranteeing full current account convertibility and 
non-discriminatory currency arrangements.  In early 1996 Uzbekistan had committed to formally 
adopting Article VIII, and its currency was de facto convertible, but the commitment was abandoned 
and controls introduced in the second half of 1996.  Although frequent declarations of intent were 
announced in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the introduction of currency convertibility was delayed 
until October 2003. Turkmenistan made circulation of foreign currencies illegal in December 1995, 
although the small private sector had reasonable access to foreign currency and the official and curb 
rates were close together until the second half of 1998, when tight exchange controls were introduced. 
7 After the August 1998 Russian crisis, which hit Kazakhstan hardest among the Central Asian 
countries, Kazakhstan introduced a 20% value-added tax on all personal imports from Russia, the 
Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan, and then in December 1998 enacted a law on “Measures to Protect 
the Domestic Market from Imported Goods”.  Under this law, special tariffs as high as 200% were 
imposed on a number of goods imported from the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan in February 1999, 
when a number of other restrictions such as import quotas on cement imports from the Kyrgyz 
Republic were also introduced.  In April 1999 the 200% February tariffs were eliminated, but new 
licensing procedures, transit fees and mandatory deposits on imports from the Kyrgyz Republic and 
Uzbekistan were introduced and the Kazakh tenge was floated, which led to an effective fifty percent 
devaluation.  Also in early 1999, Uzbekistan tightened its foreign exchange controls and introduced a 
5% tax on all purchases of foreign exchange.  Turkmenistan closed the commercial banks’ foreign 
exchange window in December 1998, and enacted legislation requiring all export and import contracts 
to be approved by the State Commodity Exchange.  
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trade, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, are necessarily trading nations because they 
have such obvious comparative advantages in natural gas and in cotton.  The Kyrgyz 
Republic and Tajikistan are open in terms of low trade barriers, but the volume of 
their international trade is limited by their relative resource scarcity and by their 
landlocked status and difficulty of transiting neighbours. Kazakhstan is the biggest 
trading nation, and the gap is widening as the country rides an oil boom driven by 
new discoveries as well as high world oil prices. 
 
2. The World Trade Organization 
 
WTO membership would appear to be a natural institutional counterpart to economic 
openness.  In the 1990s, however, the Central Asian countries were suspicious of 
international obligations which placed constraints on their policy autonomy.  They 
were happy to join the United Nations as a signal of nationhood, and to join the IMF 
and World Bank and the regional development banks as potential sources of capital, 
but apart from the Kyrgyz Republic they held back on WTO accession.  For 
Turkmenistan, this attitude remains even in 2005, as the President views WTO 
membership as incompatible with the country’s neutrality.  
The first part of this section describes the current WTO status of the five 
Central Asian countries.  The second part examines the experience of the only Central 
Asian country to have joined the WTO.  The remaining parts analyse the 
consequences for the Central Asian countries of China’s WTO accession in December 
2001, Russia’s expected WTO accession, and the accession of the Central Asian 
countries currently negotiating WTO membership. 
 
(a) WTO Status 
 
With low average tariffs, the main obstacle to WTO membership has been Central 
Asian governments’ unwillingness to formally abjure all of the non-tariff barriers 
described in the previous section.  So far, only the Kyrgyz Republic among the 
Central Asian countries has joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), which it did 
in 1998 (Table 4).  Kazakhstan’s application appears to be fairly far-advanced.  
Uzbekistan’s accession process is at an earlier stage than Kazakhstan’s.  Tajikistan 
applied for WTO membership in 2001.  Turkmenistan has not made an application.
8 
  The Kyrgyz Republic was the first Central Asian country to apply for WTO 
membership.  Given its liberal trade policies, including a low and even tariff structure 
and few non-tariff barriers, negotiations went smoothly and the country became the 
first former Soviet republic to join the WTO.  In the transition country context, the 
Kyrgyz Republic was typical of a number of small countries with liberal policies 
whose accession negotiations were untroubling to existing members.
9 
Uzbekistan was the second Central Asian country to apply, and the Working 
Party on the accession of Uzbekistan to the WTO was established in December 1994. 
This was during a period of substantial reform of the Uzbekistan’s economy which 
had been initiated in January 1994 with a purposeful macroeconomic stabilization 
package.  The reforms, however, began to lose momentum and were substantially 
undermined by the reintroduction of rigid exchange controls in October 1996.  The 
                                                   
8 For more details on the Central Asian countries’ WTO relations, see Pomfret (2003) and 
Michalopoulos (2003). 
9 Slovenia joined the WTO in 1995, Bulgaria in 1996, Latvia and Estonia in 1999, Georgia, Albania 
and Croatia in 2000, Lithuania and Moldova in 2001, Armenia in 2003.  
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reform slowdown was reflected in snail’s pace progress through the WTO accession 
process.  Uzbekistan submitted its Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime in 
September 1998 and replies to questions were circulated in October 1999.  The first 
meeting of the Working Party took place on 17 July 2002.  The October 2003 
reforms, which included establishment of currency convertibility, may signal a change 
of direction which could accelerate the accession process. 
  Kazakhstan's Working Party was established in February 1996. Bilateral 
market access negotiations in goods and services commenced in October 1997, and 
are continuing based on revised offers in goods and services.  The process slowed 
down in 1998 following the Russian Crisis and its contagion effects on Kazakhstan, 
but has been revitalized since 2001.
10 
In May 2001 Tajikistan lodged a formal request for accession.  A Working 
Party was established at the WTO General Council meeting in July 2001.  Tajikistan 
has not yet submitted a Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime, and the Working 
Party has not yet met. 
 
(b) The Experience of the Kyrgyz Republic 
 
The Kyrgyz Republic’s WTO experience has become a disputed element in trade 
policy debates elsewhere in Central Asia and in Azerbaijan.  Opponents of WTO 
membership cite the Kyrgyz Republic’s poor economic performance since 1998 as 
evidence of a harmful effect of WTO membership.  Such an interpretation is difficult 
to prove or disprove empirically given the many other candidates for explaining the 
country’s disappointing economic performance in the final years of the century.  The 
1998 Russian Crisis, Kazakhstan’s large currency devaluation, and the Kyrgyz 
Republic’s massive banking crisis (three of the country’s four largest banks were 
liquidated in 1998 and 1999) were major negative shocks to the Kyrgyz economy 
which coincided with WTO accession.  The weakened economy of the Kyrgyz 
Republic certainly failed to reap much in the way of immediate benefits from WTO 
membership, but it is hard to demonstrate that it suffered harm from accession.
11 
A more robust criticism of the Kyrgyz Republic’s accession experience is that 
the negotiators, whether due to inexperience or by intent, failed to make transitional 
arrangements or gain exemptions that would have protected Kyrgyz interests.  Some 
learning process is reflected in Kazakhstan’s lengthier and more detailed WTO 
negotiations, and harder stance on some of the voluntary codes.  The appropriate 
negotiating balance must reflect a country’s preferences and compliance capabilities; 
immediate compliance may be problematic and a phasing-in period desirable. 
                                                   
10 Topics under discussion in the Working Party include agriculture, the customs system (and customs 
union arrangements), price controls, import licensing, industrial subsidies, sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures (SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBT), transparency of the legal system and legislative 
reform, services and intellectual property rights (TRIPS).  The common belief is that, because of the 
Kazakhstan economy’s close trade links with Russia, Kazakhstan’s WTO accession will follow very 
soon after that of Russia. 
11 Trend (2003, 55-60) contrasts the 7-9% GDP growth of 1996 and 1997 with the 2-5% growth in the 
years 1998-2001.  The Azerbaijani report mentions the other negative shocks, but focuses on WTO 
accession as the main cause of disappointing post-1998 growth, alleviated only by exports from the 
Kumtor goldmine whose growth was independent of WTO status.  In a study of twenty-five transition 
economies during the period 1990-8, Campos (2004) found no robust relationship between WTO 
membership and the rate of economic growth, although he did find a positive effect of WTO 
membership on domestic reform; see also, Bachetta and Drabek (2002).  
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It is, however, unlikely that WTO provisions would harm a small open 
economy, although specific interest groups in the country may lose out.  The basic 
WTO principles, embodied in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
are general in applicability, and, although every nation has its own specific features, 
they do not imply that the WTO principles need to be modified.  A red herring for 
many CIS countries (and China) in their WTO accession negotiations has been the 
pursuance of developing country status in order to qualify for special and differential 
treatment.  All of the evidence suggests that developing country status has been of 
little value to its beneficiaries.
12  On the other hand, the CIS countries have made little 
effort to shed their “transition” status.
13  The transition from central planning is no 
longer the defining feature or descriptive of the Central Asian countries’ economic 
systems, but “transition” status allows the countries to be treated as non-market 
economies in anti-dumping determinations.  In sum, developing country status may be 
difficult to negotiate and is scarcely worth the effort, while transition status may be 
difficult to shed but in view of the salience of anti-dumping measures as protective 
instruments it is definitely worth the effort. 
 
(c) Trade with China and the Impact of Chinese WTO Accession 
 
China joined the WTO in December 2001, over fifteen years after the application was 
lodged.  The Chinese negotiations were affected by specific political factors, notably 
the lengthy delay following the June 1989 Tiananmen incident, which prevented 
conclusion of negotiations during the GATT era.  The drawn-out negotiations meant 
that by the time they were concluded much of the necessary adjustment in China’s 
external trade polices had already taken place by the time of accession.
14  In the 
literature on China’s WTO accession there is little mention of the impact on the 
Central Asian countries.  This is primarily because the Central Asian countries are 
minor trading partners or investment suppliers for China., and consideration of 
Central Asia arises largely in the context of energy supplies or security, neither of 
which has much to do with WTO status.  China is more important for the Central 
Asian countries’ trade, although the numbers are still not large (Table 5).
15 
In the early 1990s trade between Central Asia and China grew rapidly from a 
very low base, although hard data are unavailable.  The growth slowed in 1993-4 
amid currency changes, and in the mid-1990s some Central Asian governments 
expressed concern about their markets being flooded by Chinese consumer goods, 
                                                   
12  Donor-determined schemes under the Generalized System of Preferences grant very limited 
preferential access to developing country exports, and even this can be withdrawn at short notice if the 
developing country actually succeeds in increasing its exports substantially.   
13 This may change since agreement was reached in 2002 as part of Russia’s WTO accession 
negotiations that it be treated as a market economy. Transition status allows the importing country to 
disregard actual prices in the alleged dumping country when calculating dumping margins and instead 
to use constructed values, which are often biased in favour of the import-competing industry’s claims. 
14 There is a huge literature on China and the WTO.  The recent collection edited by Bhattasali et al. 
contains studies on the main aspects affecting the Chinese economy. 
15 Wiemer (2000) reports estimates of shuttle exports at $300-600 million.  Even with the highest 
estimates of shuttle trade, trade with Central Asia amounted to less than one percent of China’s total 
trade in the late 1990s.  For Xinjiang Province, however, over half of international trade is with Central 
Asia.  For Central Asia, trade with China is more significant, perhaps 5% of total international trade. 
The main items were iron and steel ($202m.), copper ($87m.), aluminium ($53m.) and fuel ($40m.) 
imports from Kazakhstan and shoe exports ($80m) to Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic. Some 
commodity trade was dominated by bulk state purchases and could fluctuate from year to year, eg. 
Uzbekistan’s cotton sales to China fell from $133 million in 1997 to $29 million in 1998  
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while Chinese traders and potential investors worried about the insecurity of property 
rights in Central Asia.  The evidence of the bazaars is that unofficial import of 
consumer goods from China continues to flourish.  A growing trend, especially in the 
cities of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, is the presence of more or less 
permanent Chinese traders, suggesting increased volume of trade.  
  The potential for increased trade between Central Asia and China is 
substantial given their differing factor endowments and natural resources, but 
realizing the potential depends upon a favourable trade environment and improved 
physical infrastructure.
16  China’s WTO accession could, given these favourable 
conditions, kick-start trade with Central Asia.  Pressure to improve entry into the 
financial sector and to the logistics sector as a result of China’s WTO entry 
commitments should reduce trading costs within China, with particular benefit to 
China’s inland provinces such as Xinjiang.  Such improvements could also facilitate 
international trade, including trade with Central Asia which is currently conducted to 
a large extent in cash and is hampered by prohibitive transport and other transactions 
costs. 
 
(d) The Impact of Russian WTO Accession  
 
Russia’s WTO accession negotiations have progressed in fits and starts.  Although the 
Working Party was established in 1993, little progress was made until after 2001.  In 
2002 the EU and USA both granted Russia market economy status, which reduces the 
scope for using constructed values in assessing antidumping duties, but concerns 
remain (especially in the EU) over Russia’s subsidized energy prices.  Agriculture and 
services are the other major sticking areas.  Work commenced in 2004 on a draft 
Report of the Working Party, suggesting that negotiations were reaching the endgame 
stage. 
  Existing empirical studies of the economic impact of Russian WTO 
membership emphasise the benefits to Russia from increased investment and 
technology transfer.
17  This suggests that the main impacts on Central Asia will be 
investment diversion and increasing import demand.  The former is likely to be minor 
because the amount of DFI in Central Asia is small, apart from energy investments in 
Kazakhstan and to a much smaller extent Turkmenistan (Table 6).  The potential of 
benefiting from a larger Russian market will be felt most by Kazakhstan as the 
Central Asian country most heavily involved in trade with Russia. 
  For the Central Asian countries trade relations with Russia are substantially 
more important than their trade relations with China (Table 7).  For Kazakhstan, the 
most important Central Asian trading nation with both countries, exports to Russia 
have been at least double those to China and imports from Russia have been several 
times larger than those from China; this last point may be slightly offset by the shuttle 
trade, but no estimates of the unofficial cross-border trade with China bring total 
imports close to the amount coming from Russia.  The Kyrgyz Republic is the only 
                                                   
16 In response to high oil prices, China took the initiative in funding an oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to 
China on which construction began in 2004 and which will eventually impact on bilateral trade. 
17 Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (2002), employing a computable general equilibrium model of the 
Russian economy, estimate long-run gains from WTO accession equal to over fifty percent of current 
consumption, and these mainly capture increases in total factor productivity associated with 
liberalization of foreign direct investment.  Yudaeva (2003) reviews other studies.  Lissovolik and 
Lissovolik (2004) and Babetskaia-Kukharchuk and Maurel (2004) use the gravity model to assess the 
impact of Russian WTO accession on trade flows.  
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one of the Central Asian countries for which the two large trading partners have been 
of roughly equal weight in recent years.  For the three countries negotiating WTO 
membership, Russia is a significant trading partner in contrast to the small magnitudes 
of China trade. 
 
(e) Central Asian Countries’ WTO Accession 
 
The most important benefit of WTO membership would be to place all Central Asian 
trade on a common basis of international trade law, and potentially to separate trade 
from politics.  The benefits of WTO membership should be accentuated by China’s 
accession in 2001 and by Russia’s impending accession.  If Russia’s outstanding 
issues can be settled expeditiously, then formal membership is likely to occur in 2006.  
Kazakhstan’s WTO accession has long been expected to be closely tied to that of 
Russia, due to the strong economic links with its northern neighbour.
18  Pressure 
would then be on Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to accelerate their accession negotiations. 
The Central Asian countries’ accession would provide a common framework for 
formal trade policies and dispute resolution with respect to both intra-regional trade 
and trade with all of the region’s economically important neighbours.
19 
  Overall, the trade performance of the Central Asian countries has been 
disappointing and below potential.  Apart from Kazakhstan’s oil-driven post-1999 
boom, the Central Asian countries’ export growth since 1994 has been mediocre 
(Table 1).  The explanation is a mixture of the destruction of intra-CIS trade due to 
the erection of borders, and the failure to realize the potential for trading in the major 
non-CIS markets.  One indicator of the potential for international trade is the contrast 
between intra-Russian trade and international intra-CIS trade.  Using a gravity model, 
Djankov and Freund (2002) estimate that trade among Russian provinces is around 
sixty percent higher than trade between CIS countries, ceteris paribus; this suggests 
the large orders of magnitude by which the Central Asian countries’ trade could 
increase if the size of the border effect could be reduced.  In World Bank (2004, 8), 
the actual trade flows are compared to those predicted from a gravity model of world 
trade flows; in 2001 all five Central Asian countries still traded more than predicted 
with CIS countries, and they mostly traded less than predicted with the EU, USA and 
China.
20  Clearly such estimates are no more than indicative in what remains a 
disequilibrium situation, but they suggest the potential benefits from reducing the 
costs of conducting international trade and facilitating access to the major world 
markets.  The lack of a stable institutional environment for international trade is part 
of the high costs of doing trade with Central Asian countries, and WTO membership 
could alleviate these costs.. 
WTO accession could bring further benefits by encouraging liberal policies 
and punishing backsliding on commitments.  Such an environment would help to 
attract foreign direct investment, as well as making domestic investment more 
attractive.  With a positive domestic environment, WTO membership helps to ensure 
                                                   
18 A major agenda item at the Eurasian Community’s May 2002 Moscow summit was coordination of 
the WTO negotiations by Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.  The Kyrgyz Republic has been 
threatening to withhold consent for Kazakhstan’s accession until unresolved transit issues are settled, 
but that is unlikely to be an insuperable obstacle. 
19 Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, are all WTO signatories.   
20 The only exceptions to this last generalization are that Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic traded 
more than predicted with the EU and with China.  
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that a country can reap benefits from specialization and trade with diminished fear of 
protectionist responses in foreign markets. 
Finally, WTO membership would grant some leverage to reduce existing 
illiberal polices.  Most immediately, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan would want to join 
WTO member countries lobbying for reduced subsidies to cotton producers in the 
USA and EU.
21  Four West African countries have had success in publicizing the 
harmful impact of these subsidies on some poor countries’ export earnings, and they 
formally introduced the Cotton Initiative into the Doha Development Agenda in April 
2003 (Sumner, 2004).  In October 2004 Brazil obtained a WTO ruling that some 
government subsidies to US cotton producers are illegal, and that case will spend the 
next year under appeal.  Central Asian cotton-producing nations would broaden the 
coalition and highlight the iniquity of subsidizing rich country farmers to the 
detriment of poor farmers in areas with a comparative advantage in growing cotton.
22 
 
3. The Attraction of Regionalism 
 
This section reviews regional organizations which involve one or more of the five 
Central Asian countries and which contain or envision a trade component.
23  The 
subsections assess arrangements within the former Soviet space, new organizations 
with an exclusively Central Asian membership, relations with southern neighbours in 
the Economic Cooperation Organization, and relations with Russia and China within 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.  The common question running through  
these assessments is why have the Central Asian leaders been willing to sign so many 
regional agreements and so unwilling to implement any preferential trading 
arrangements?  
 
(a) Arrangements within the former Soviet space 
 
The five Central Asian countries are all members of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS), but that organization has had little impact on trade 
conditions.  The CIS was initially conceived as a framework in which to maintain 
economic ties among the Soviet successor states. In both the political and the 
economic spheres, however, the replacement of the Soviet Union by sovereign nations 
created conflicts that the CIS framework was unable to contain.  Between 1992 and 
1994, CIS politics were largely defined by regional conflicts in the Caucasus and in 
Tajikistan, in all of which (with the partial exception of Tajikistan) Russia opted for a 
unilateral solution.  After 1994 Russia sought more multilateral approaches, but the 
                                                   
21 Direct assistance to cotton growers amounted to $2.3 billion in the USA and $0.8 billion in the EU in 
the 2001/2 season. Baffes (2004) estimates that these subsidies raised producer prices above the world 
price by 91% in the USA, by 144% in Greece and by 184% in Spain; the domestic supply response to 
these artificially high prices lowers world prices, and removal of the US and EU subsidies would 
increase world prices by as much as 71 percent.   
22 The cost to Central Asia of the subsidy-induced lowering of world prices is large.  With world cotton 
prices 71% higher, the gain in export revenue would have added 3% to Uzbekistan’s GDP, 6% to 
Tajikistan’s GDP and 3% to Turkmenistan’s GDP in 2000, even without any change in their output 
(Pomfret, 2004).  These substantial benefits would accrue every year after abolition of the subsidies.  
Moreover, with more attractive world prices, the quantity of cotton exported would increase (by 5.8% 
in Uzbekistan according to Baffes’s estimates), adding to the potential benefits. 
23 Other groupings involving Central Asian countries and their neighbours based on cultural or 
geographical affinity (eg. the Turkic Group, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Black Sea 
and Caspian Sea organizations) contain no trade mandate  
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decline in Russian power exposed by the Chechnya conflict and the freezing of the 
main intra-CIS conflicts encouraged the emergence of alternative political initiatives, 
such as the grouping of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (GUAM).  
In the early years of the CIS many agreements to form economic arrangements 
were signed, but these had zero practical impact.  This was especially true in the final 
year of the ruble zone.  Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan reached an agreement in May 
1993 to set up an economic union, and they signed a formal treaty to that effect in 
September 1993.  Georgia signed some of the provisions, and Ukraine became an 
associate member, so that the union included all the former Soviet republics except 
for the Baltic countries and Turkmenistan.  The economic union treaty was supported 
by a host of other formal agreements on trade, payments, customs procedures and 
classifications, legal harmonization, and so forth, but neither the economic union nor 
subsequent proposals involving the CIS as a group made any practical progress 
(Sakwa and Webber, 1999, 386-90).
24 
The reality of intra-CIS economic relations is more complex.  During the early 
1990s, national borders were poorly monitored, and goods and people continued to 
pass fairly unimpeded.  The situation gradually changed, especially over the second 
half of the 1990s, with the erection of formal customs posts at crossing points of what 
had been inter-republic borders.  As mentioned in section 1, tariffs and other trade 
obstacles were introduced, although actual monitoring continued to be erratic and the 
distinction between legal and private levies by customs officials was not always 
transparent.  By the early 2000s, several CIS member states had introduced visa 
requirements for citizens of other CIS countries.
25 
Much of the manoeuvring within the CIS has reflected strategic or political 
decisions, without economic content.  Russia appears to view the organization as a 
vehicle for exerting political leadership in the former USSR, and sees the Collective 
Security Treaty (CST) as the main instrument. During the mid-1990s Russia 
attempted to re-establish its influence over Central Asia.  Faced with a delicate ethnic 
balance between Kazakhs and Russians, President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan tried to 
deflect the impending Russian dominance into a more cooperative structure by 
promoting a customs union.  Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were more overtly 
resistant to Russian regional designs, and Uzbekistan’s withdrawal from the CST and 
Turkmenistan’s neutrality reflected suspicion of Russian motives and a desire to 
distance themselves from Russian influence.
26  Turkmenistan adopted an autarchic 
                                                   
24 Olcott, Aslund and Garnett (1999, v) are even more dismissive of the CIS, which “has been a failure 
by almost any measure”. 
25 The most important is Russia, which generally tolerated freedom of movement prior to the outbreak 
of the second Chechen war in 1999, but has since viewed illegal immigrants as a security risk.  Russian 
officials estimate that perhaps four million illegal immigrants were working in Russia in 2002 
(compared to 300,000 guest workers with proper documentation).  New legislation, which took effect 
on 1
st. November 2002, expanded law enforcement officers’ powers to deal with illegal immigrant 
labor.  The summary deportations include an instance when 120 Tajiks were flown to Dushanbe in 
November 2002, and a similar incident a few days later involving 80 Tajiks. 
26 Uzbekistan withdrew from the CIS Collective Security Treaty in 1998, and aligned itself with the 
GUAM (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Moldova) grouping.  Turkmenistan’s President skipped CIS 
summits in Yalta in August 2000 and Sochi in August 2001, although he did attend the February 2002 
informal summit at Chimbulak in Kazakhstan.  Turkmenistan’s relations with Russia were revived by 
Russian assistance in bringing Boris Shikhmuradov, a leading dissident who had been in exile in 
Moscow, to trial in Ashgabat in connection with the November 2001 assassination attempt on 
Turkmenistan’s president.  
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political position, seeking United Nations guarantees of its neutrality.
27  Uzbekistan, 
after adopting a macroeconomic stabilization program in January 1994, by contrast 
became more prominent on the international stage as President Karimov sought to 
portray himself as the region’s leader.
28  Concerns about potential Uzbek hegemony 
tended to push Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, which also fears Uzbek 
irredentist claims to its territory, closer to Russia. 
One of the leaders in trying to retain the CIS as a formal regional trading 
arrangement since the collapse of the ruble zone has been Kazakhstan’s President, 
Nursultan Nazarbayev, who in 1994-5 advocated a Eurasian Union (Kalyuzhnova, 
1998, 49-50).  In a 1994 comment, President Nazarbayev, frustrated by lack of 
implementation of the many agreements signed by CIS members, observed that: 
“Since the time of the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States, roughly 400 agreements have been adopted.  However, as yet there 
have been no substantive results because individual national governments 
continue to reject certain provisions and interpret the meaning of the 
agreements in their own interest.” (Nazarbayev, 1996, 234). 
In December 1994, Kazakhstan announced the formation of a customs union treaty 
with Russia and Belarus, which came into effect on 15 July 1995.  The Kyrgyz 
Republic acceded in 1996 and Tajikistan in 1999 making it a Union of Five. 
Despite the formal agreements between 1994 and 2000, there was little 
evidence of implementation by the Central Asian countries. Echoing Nazarbayev’s 
earlier reservations about the CIS, the Kyrgyz Republic’s President Akaev was quoted 
in 1999 as saying that the customs union agreements existed “on paper only” 
(Zhalimbetova  and Gleason, 2001, 4).  Indeed, members were operating in 
contradictory directions in terms of their actual policies.  For example, it seemed 
likely that, as part of the custom union’s common external trade policy, the tariff 
bindings which the Kyrgyz Republic agreed to in its 1998 WTO accession 
negotiations would be unacceptably low for Russia or Belarus, and a similar issue 
would arise if Kazakhstan were to join the WTO.
29 
In October 2000 the Union of Five was renamed the Eurasian Economic 
Community and a new treaty was signed in Astana, which came into effect in May 
2001.  The institutional framework has been strengthened in a bid to ensure better 
implementation.  The organization is managed by an Interstate Council (chaired by 
President Nazarbayev), an Integration Committee, an Inter-Parliament Assembly (in 
Saint Petersburg) and by a Eurasian Community Court.  The voting and financing 
formula gives Russia forty percent, Belarus and Kazakhstan twenty percent each, and 
the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan ten percent each, with a two-thirds majority being 
                                                   
27 The UN General Assembly formally recognized Turkmenistan’s neutrality in a resolution of 12 
December 1995 (Freitag-Wirminghaus, 1998; Werner, 2001). 
28 In 1995-6 Uzbekistan became the most prominent regional ally of the USA.  On occasion only Israel 
and Uzbekistan voted with the USA at the United Nations, and at the May 1996 ECO summit 
Uzbekistan’s denunciation of Iran was so vitriolic that the summit ended a day earlier than planned.  In 
July 1996 President Karimov was warmly received by President Clinton in Washington DC.   For more 
details of Uzbekistan’s evolving foreign economic policies, see Spechler (1999). 
29 In September 1996, when Kazakhstan’s WTO accession seemed more imminent than proved the 
case, President Nazarbayev indicated that Kazakhstan would leave the customs union when it acceded 
to the WTO (Webber, 1997, 56).  For both the Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan, harmonizing their 
tariffs with Russia’s would bring no benefits, and would lead to trade diversion and trade destruction; 
(a) Rusian goods would have a larger preference margin, encouraging greater replacement of imports 
from the least-cost supplier by more costly Russian goods, and (b) higher external tariffs would 
encourage displacement of some imports by inefficient domestic producers.  
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required on “major policy issues”.  Thus, Russia has veto power, but to implement 
new measures Russia will generally need the support of at least one other member, 
and at least two others on major policy issues.  Within the new framework any 
member failing to abide by Community rules can be expelled. 
The functional areas of the new Community differ little from those agreed 
within the earlier frameworks.  The emphasis is on free intra-Community trade as well 
as a common market for labour and capital, common policies towards migration, and 
more general policy harmonization.  A specific intention is to coordinate WTO 
accession negotiations, but even this attempt at a common external trade policy is 
dubious given that the Kyrgyz Republic is already a WTO member and that Belarus 
appears to have differing WTO goals than Russia.  At the May 2002 summit in 
Moscow, Moldova and Ukraine were granted observer status, although President 
Nazarbayev as Chair emphasized that they would need to bring their legislation in line 
with that of the Eurasian Community’s existing members before closer integration 
could be discussed.
30   
In contrast to its predecessor organizations, the Eurasian Community is 
intended to operate as a regional international organization rather than as an inter-state 
agreement.  At the political level it has very strong support from Kazakhstan, but the 
attitude of the other signatories is more lukewarm, and at the May 2002 summit 
Belarus President Alyaksandr Lukashenka openly criticized the implementation 
record of other members.   Kazakhstan’s ambitious aspirations were reflected in 
statements by the governor of the National Bank of Kazakhstan, Grigori Marchenko, 
that the Community should aim to have a single currency and that “preliminary 
procedures for the introduction of a single currency might take only five to seven 
years”.
31  Later in 2002 Russian Prime Minister Kasyanov expressed hope that the 
Eurasian Community would adopt the Russian ruble as a common currency.  In 
practice, however, Eurasian Community integration plans stalled in 2003.
32 
An alternative grouping among CIS countries emerged in February 2003 when 
the leaders of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan reached a tentative agreement 
to create a United Economic Space (UES).  Russia promoted the UES concept, but the 
other three countries have bridled at suggestions of establishing supranational 
institutions and of adopting the Russian ruble as a common currency.
33  The UES 
concept is even less popular among other CIS countries who view it as an attempt by 
the economically strong to distance themselves from the economically weaker CIS 
countries.  Both the Eurasian Community and the UES reflect a more assertive 
Russian stance in leading regionalism in the former Soviet space, but so far none of 
the intra-CIS arrangements has had much impact on trade relations. 
                                                   
30 The presumed eagerness of other states to join the Community was not shared, eg. President Kuchma 
was quick to deny any such desire by Ukraine. 
31 Quoted in the International Herald Tribune, sponsored section, 24
th. April, 2002. 
32 For an optimistic analysis of the Community’s prospects, see Zhalimbetova and Gleason (2001).  In 
June 2004, however, Belarus President Lukashenka told the Community’s General Secretary that 
“member states have got practically nothing from the Eurasian Community”.  
33 Even as Russia was promoting the UES concept at a political level, in 2002-3 Russia was raising 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers on specific imports from CIS countries, such as steel from Ukraine 
(Yudaeva, 2003).  By the end of 2003 the UES appeared to have joined the list of defunct schemes, and 
the concluding communiqué of the January 2004 Astana summit between presidents Putin and 
Nazarbayev made no mention of the UES.  At a May 2004 UES summit in the Crimea, however, 
Nazarbayev called for UES members to form a customs union, but Ukraine was not interested.  During 
2004 senior Russian officials also called for closer integration, using the ruble as a common settlement 




(b) Organizations with an exclusively Central Asian membership 
 
During the second half of 1993 the presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan made 
several statements on the need to maintain a common economic space in Central Asia 
amid the discord of the CIS and imminent breakdown of the common currency area.  
After the collapse of the ruble zone in November 1993, the presidents of Kazakhstan, 
the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan agreed to create an integrated economic space, 
announced in the Tashkent Declaration of January 1994 and formalized in the 
Cholpon-Ata Treaty signed by the heads of state on 30
th. April 1994.  Initially called 
the Central Asian Economic Union, and intended to be modelled on the European 
Union, this organization evolved into the Central Asian Economic Community 
(CAEC), when Tajikistan joined in 1998. 
The CAEC was viewed as a forum for resolving disputes within Central Asia, 
and also as a vehicle for promoting collaborative projects.  The promotion of 
collaborative projects would require investment, and thus one of the main positive 
initiatives of the CAEC was the creation of an Interstate Central Asian Bank of 
Cooperation and Development, which was founded in June 1994 with head office in 
Almaty and branches in Bishkek and Tashkent.  In the mid-1990s the Bank granted 
several small credits, such as $300,000 to an Almaty firm producing electric meters, 
$300,000 to an Uzbek firm producing blood products, and $300,000 to a Kyrgyz firm 
manufacturing electric motors.  The modest scale of these credits illustrates that the 
Bank was playing a primarily symbolic role.  By January 1997, the participating 
countries had given the Bank only some two-thirds of its charter capital, and it was 
clearly incapable of drawing substantial external funds into Central Asia for 
investment in collaborative projects.  In April 1997 Uzbekistan openly expressed its 
disillusionment with the Bank’s work.
34  The CAEC member countries insisted that 
the Interstate Central Asian Bank of Cooperation and Development allocate resources 
proportionately to each country’s contribution, so that little attention was paid to 
profitability or to externalities in the form of enhanced regional integration.  Apart 
from the activity of the Interstate Central Asian Bank of Cooperation and 
Development, the CAEC had little in the way of practical achievements.  Officials 
claimed to have made some contributions in tax harmonization and elimination of 
double taxation, but these are difficult to document, and the CAEC had little impact 
on intra-regional trade. 
On 28
th. February 2002 the four leaders proclaimed the Central Asian 
Cooperation Organization (CACO) as the successor to the CAEC.  The Central Asian 
leaders have attempted to distinguish the CACO from its predecessor by emphasizing 
improved effectiveness.  By some counts, at the CAEC meetings the Central Asian 
leaders passed over 250 resolutions, but the implementation record fell far behind the 
statements of intentions.  The founding agreement of the CACO, however, continues 
to make lofty aspirations without paying much concern to institutionalizing 
implementation. 
                                                   
34 Uzbekistan’s disillusionment was partly driven by the introduction in the previous autumn of strict 
exchange controls, which made it practically impossible for borrowers in Uzbekistan to access funds 
from the Bank which made hard currency loans and required repayment in hard currency.  In the view 
of Gleason (2001, 1087), “The key obstacle to greater sub-regional economic cooperation at the end of 
the century was Uzbekistan” because of its inconvertible currency and protectionist trade policies.  
There is some truth to this, but the reasons for lack of cooperation were deeper and more widespread.  
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There was a flurry of activity after February 2002 under CACO auspices. The 
CACO summit in Dushanbe in October 2002 was combined with the meeting of the 
four heads of state of the International Fund to Save the Aral Sea.  A regional 
business forum held its first session in November 2002 in Tashkent.  As with the 
Eurasian Community, it is early days to judge whether implementation will in fact 
improve, but prospects may be even less favourable for the CACO in view of the 
political rifts between Central Asian leaders.  In May 2004 Russia became a CACO 
member, but this seemed to be a sign of Uzbekistan-Russian rapprochement rather 
than a strengthening of the CACO. 
As an alternative forum for regional cooperation, the Special Programme for 
the Economies of Central Asia (SPECA) was launched in 1998 with the support of the 
two United Nations regional organizations, the Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) and the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE).  The 
presidents of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed the 
Tashkent Declaration on 26 March 1998 creating SPECA, and in September 1998 
Turkmenistan officially indicated its intention to sign the Declaration and to 
participate in SPECA projects. 
The main purpose of SPECA is to support the Central Asian countries in 
strengthening their cooperation in order to both stimulate their economic development 
and facilitate their integration with the economies of Asia and Europe.  Through 
consultation with the participating countries, five priority areas were identified and 
working groups set up as instruments to develop and implement the program in each 
priority area.  SPECA’s achievements have been limited.  In part, this is because it has 
no self-funding mechanism.  Two of the working groups have been single-project 
dominated, with their activities determined by available funding, while the other three 
working groups have little concrete to show (two have not even been set up, and the 
third’s achievements are limited to bilateral issues between two countries).
35  The lack 
of achievement also reflects incomplete participation; Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan 
have not attended the meetings of the Regional Advisory Committee, the governing 
body of SPECA which is responsible for strategic decisions.  The SPECA concept 
was formally adopted in April 2000 at the Eurasian Economic Summit in Almaty, a 
forum in which Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan were participants 
and the other two countries were not. 
The existence of SPECA is symptomatic of the proliferation of institutions for 
regional cooperation in Central Asia.  If the CAEC/CACO had been an effective 
regional organization, there would have been little need for SPECA.  Precisely 
because of the political obstacles to the smooth running of CACO, however, SPECA 
could have a positive role to play if it were to be accepted as a forum for technical 
cooperation, rather than having the political connotations of a European-Union-style 
organization that the CACO and Eurasian Community embody.  In practice, however, 
SPECA has fallen victim to the political split in Central Asia, becoming identified 
with the Eurasian Community’s Central Asian members and spurned by the other two 
Central Asian countries. 
Although the formal agreements have had little impact to date, the 
CAEC/CACO and SPECA organizational structures survive because the need for 
                                                   
35 The energy and water group has been supported by a UN-funded project on efficient water use, the 
foreign investment promotion group has organized a conference in Dushanbe, the transport and border 
crossing group has served as a forum for discussion of transit issues between Kazakhstan and the 
Kyrgyz Republic, and the industrial restructuring and technical assistance with pipelines groups have 
not met.  
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regional cooperation is self-evident.  Action on the Aral Sea and other water 
management issues has to involve all five Central Asian countries to be effective.  
Transport and transit matters also require some degree of regional cooperation, 
although the individual countries’ needs vary and neighbouring countries should also 
be involved.  The Central Asian regional organizations have, however, made no 
attempt to coordinate trade policy on a preferential basis, and by 2004 there was no 
effective regional organization composed solely of the five Central Asian countries. 
 
(c) Relations with southern neighbours 
 
The Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) offered to the newly independent 
countries a regional trading arrangement that could promote a southward reorientation 
of their trade from the patterns imposed within the Soviet economy.  ECO’s founding 
document is the 1977 Treaty of Izmir, signed by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, although 
the organization was dormant between the 1979 Iranian revolution and 1985.
36  The 
three founding members then attempted to revive the organization by offering 
preferential tariff treatment to one another, but the list of eligible products was 
extremely restricted.  At the eighth ECO summit in Dushanbe in September 2004, 
Iran proposed committing to an ECO free trade zone by 2015, but no practical steps 
were taken.  
In 1992 the five Central Asian countries, together with Afghanistan and 
Azerbaijan, became members of the Economic Cooperation Organization.  The 
members of the expanded organization contained over three hundred million people, 
and included all non-Arab Islamic countries west of India.
37  In 1993 ECO gained 
observer status at the United Nations General Assembly, and it was later accorded 
observer status at the WTO.  In 1996 the Council of Ministers approved a 
restructuring, which included the establishment of a permanent ECO Secretariat in 
Tehran. 
The ECO members have established eight regional institutions: a trade and 
development bank, an insurance institute, a shipping company, an airline, a 
reinsurance company, a chamber of commerce, a science foundation, and a 
cultural/educational institute.  In 1995 it was agreed that the bank would be in 
Istanbul, and subsequently ECO issued a statement of intent that the reinsurance 
company would be located in Pakistan.  Amidst bickering over location and funding, 
implementation proceeded slowly.  The shipping company operated two leased 
multipurpose cargo vessels in the Persian Gulf and some ships plying the Caspian 
Sea, but despite being the sole profitable ECO project the shipping line ran into 
financial difficulties due to some ECO members’ failure to make their contributions to 
the capitalization fund (Afrasiabi, 2000, part two). 
The ECO heads of state have met frequently since 1992, and the summits have 
typically included grand declarations.  The implementation record is, however, poor.  
This is highlighted by the history of the ECO transit agreements.  Only eight countries 
signed the 1995 transit trade agreement, and the two non-signatories, Afghanistan and 
Uzbekistan, straddle some of the most important routes in the region.  The agreement 
officially entered into force in December 1997, but by early 1999 only five national 
governments had ratified the agreement.  The modified, and much watered down, 
                                                   
36 The Treaty was modified at a 1990 meeting in Islamabad and subsequently adopted as the Basic 
Charter of ECO. For a more detailed account of ECO’s history, see Pomfret (1999). 
37 The Turkish Muslim Community of Cyprus is not a member of ECO, but its representatives have 
observer status.  
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1998 transit agreement had, as of mid-2000, only been approved by Azerbaijan and 
Tajikistan, whose geographical position makes them marginal countries to an ECO-
wide transit arrangement.  The unwillingness of key member countries to accept the 
principle of unhindered passage of goods in transit is a major obstacle to any concrete 
achievement by ECO. 
As with the CAEC/CACO, the practical impact of ECO has been limited.  In 
both organizations a fundamental obstacle to regional integration is the similarity of 
the member countries’ economies, which all tend to be specialized on a small group 
of primary products (oil, gas, minerals, and cotton).  Trade between the five Central 
Asian countries and their southern neighbours has expanded since 1992, admittedly 
from a low base and more slowly than many observers expected.  However, it has 
done so on a non-discriminatory MFN basis rather than within a regional trading 
arrangement such as the ECO founding members appear to have envisaged in the 
early 1990s. 
 
(d) Relations with Russia and China 
 
Another overlapping configuration, dubbed the Shanghai Five, emerged from a 
meeting in 1996 of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan 
intended to demilitarize borders.  At a summit in Dushanbe in July 2000, the Shanghai 
Five, with Uzbekistan as an observer, took up a number of themes related to trade 
facilitation as well as discussing issues such as countering Islamic terrorist groups.  
Although the countries had met since 1996 to discuss security issues, the extension 
into economic areas was a fresh departure in 2000, and the group changed their name 
to the Shanghai Forum and invited other countries to join them.  At the June 2001 
summit Uzbekistan became the sixth member and the group was renamed the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
38  Despite the intention to cover matters 
such as trade facilitation, the subsequent history of the SCO has centred on political 
rather than economic matters. 
The years 1998-9 saw the division of Central Asia into two opposing camps as 
Uzbekistan aligned with GUAM and Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan 
joined Russia in the Union of Five and its successors.  This division eased in 2000 and 
2001, in part due to the incursion of Islamic fighters into the Fergana Valley, 
presenting a common problem to the three countries whose territory was involved.  
China played a catalytic role in bringing the Central Asian countries together.  In 
1997-8 China had been an economic anchor in East Asia and had sought closer 
relations with the USA, but it gradually came to resent a perceived asymmetry in this 
rapprochement, which brought little gain to China.  After the US bombing of the 
Chinese embassy in Belgrade in spring 1999, China pursued a more anti-US course, 
embracing Japanese proposals for Asian monetary cooperation (which were opposed 
by the USA) and promoting the SCO as a more formal successor to the Shanghai 
Forum.  Although Russia saw the SCO as a vehicle for its leadership in Central Asia, 
for the Central Asian leaders, especially Uzbekistan, the SCO was palatable because 
of China’s counterweight.  Nevertheless, the regional faultline persisted as 
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan participated in the Russian-led 
Collective Security Treaty and Uzbekistan did not. 
The SCO is the only international group formed by China, and it receives 
extensive press coverage in China.  Russia was also enthusiastic in the early years of 
                                                   
38 At the 2004 SCO summit Mongolia was admitted as an observer.  
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the Shanghai Five, hoping the grouping would help Russia to retain leverage over 
Central Asia, but Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan all reached border 
delimitation agreements with China in the late 1990s without consulting Russia.  
From 1998 to 2001 the organization evolved into a Sino-Russian vehicle for opposing 
US hegemony and for mutual tolerance of anti-separatist measures in Chechnya and 
Xinjiang.  The military side remains important and joint operations planning in 2001 
represented the first cooperation between the Russian and Chinese military since the 
early 1960s.  Russia and China are united in their support for the 1972 Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty and opposed to US plans to revise the ABM Treaty.  The final 
statement at the 2001 SCO summit called the ABM Treaty “a cornerstone of stability, 
peace and nuclear deterrence”, and cooperation against terrorism was a major 
theme.
39  The SCO, however, failed to respond to the September 9
th assassination of 
Ahmad Shah Massoud or the September 11
th terrorist acts in the USA.  Chiefs of 
national border guard services met in Almaty on 24
th. April 2002 to coordinate 
responses to terrorism, the drug trade and illegal migration, but there are doubts about 
the sincerity of such meetings when the Russian military and influential Central 
Asians are believed to be participating in the drug trade.  Earlier in 2002 Chinese 
Foreign Ministry official Zhou Li called for a coordinated response against “the three 
forces” (ie. radical Chechen, Uighur and Uzbek organizations),
40 but it seems unlikely 
that China would welcome foreign troops in Xinjiang. 
After the June 2004 SCO summit, Uzbekistan and Russia signed a strategic 
partnership agreement and China announced plans to extend $500 million in loans and 
credits to Central Asian countries.  These signs of greater engagement between the 
Central Asian countries and their two large neighbours do not, however, signal a 
strengthening of the SCO as a regional organization.  Uzbekistan was reacting to a 
specific stimulus, the reduction of US assistance due to its human rights record.  
Uzbekistan responded by showing the USA that it has alternative allies who are less 
concerned about human rights, but Uzbekistan is far from abandoning the USA for the 
SCO.  On the economic level, the Central Asian countries welcome infrastructure and 
other investment from both Russia and China, but Russia does not want to see China 
gaining economic influence in Central Asia. 
More fundamentally the Central Asian governments do not share the Sino-
Russian agenda of opposing US hegemony.  Since September 2001 the governments 
of the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have been willing to cooperate 
with the USA, providing bases and so forth, rather than coordinating anti-terrorist 
action under the aegis of the SCO.  After the 2001 summit at which Uzbekistan 
became a member, President Karimov in a speech on Uzbekistan TV stated that “This 
organization must never turn into a military political bloc . . . It should not be against 
any country”.  Splits among the Central Asian leaders are also evident.  A Tajik 
official was reported in Russia as saying that “None of us is apt to welcome the Uzbek 
                                                   
39 At the June 2001 SCO summit it was decided to establish an anti-terrorist centre in Bishkek. 
However, in May 2001 the CIS Collective Security Treaty signatories had already created a rapid-
reaction force with some 2,000 soldiers from Russia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan 
committed to fighting potential insurgencies in Central Asia, and the CST would appear to be aimed at 
pre-empting Chinese (or Uzbek?) participation in joint anti-terrorist action in the region.  It took until 
December 2002 for SCO experts to meet in Bishkek to discuss the rules and activities, funding and 
staffing of the anti-terrorist centre, and then in September 2003 it was announced that the Bishkek 
centre had been cancelled and an anti-terrorist centre would be opened in Tashkent in 2004.  
40 Reported in the Far Eastern Economic Review, 17




41  Although relations with China are cordial, potential conflicts could 
surface if China proceeds with plans to divert water from rivers originating in 
Xinjiang and flowing into Russia and Kazakhstan.
42  Opinions on the future prospects 
of the SCO – or whether it has a future – are split. 
 
(e) Prospects for regionalism 
 
Table 8 summarizes the membership of the regional arrangements described in this 
section.  These arrangements have often been in implicit competition, reflecting 
differing and mutually exclusive political pacts.  The evolving patterns have 
incorporated concerns for closer or more arms-length relations with Russia and, to a 
lesser extent, China and internal competition for and suspicion of hegemonic 
leadership within Central Asia.  Such ebbing and flowing of interest in alternative 
regional permutations has inhibited the institutional development of any regional 
organization involving the Central Asian countries.  Although most regional 
agreements involving the Central Asian countries have an economic content, at least 
in their stated goals, their economic impact has been minimal.
 43  None has reached a 
stage of seriously discussing preferential trade policies, and none has posed a threat to 
multilateralism in the Central Asian countries’ trade policies. 
  Apart from the political twists and turns there are strong economic reasons 
why the Central Asian countries will not implement preferential regional trading 
arrangements.  The principal argument is the likelihood of trade diversion.  The 
Central Asian countries are competitive, producing a small range of primary products 
(cotton, oil and gas, gold and other minerals), rather than complementary.  Favouring 
imports from a neighbour will almost always involve purchasing something at well 
above the world price.   Although the political leaders may not express their concerns 
in Vinerian terms, there is a strong recognition when agreements come down to 
implementation that, while a country may want to expand the market for its own 
sheltered industries, they do not want to give preferential status to their neighbours’ 
manufactured goods. 
Regional agreements will continue to be signed in Central Asia because there 
are other reasons for regional cooperation besides trade policies.  Three reasons of 
particular significance for Central Asia are water resource management (including the 
desiccation of the Aral Sea and related energy supply issues), security and trade 
facilitation.  The failure to take any common action on the desiccation of the Aral Sea 
is symptomatic of the inability of Central Asia’s leaders to cooperate on a pressing 
regional issue, but also symbolises the ongoing need for cooperation.  Security 
                                                   
41 The statements by President Karimov and by the Tajik official were both reported in Eurasia Insight 
“Russia has Misgivings about Shanghai Cooperation Organization”, 20
th. June 2001, posted at 
http://www.eurasianet.org 
42 Horsman (2001, 79-81) discusses China’s position concluding that “China is unwilling to engage in 
meaningful cooperation or compromise in the pursuit of its water demands”.  If Kazakhstan were 
sufficiently aggravated, it might reinstate its agitation over Chinese nuclear testing at Lop Nor and 
treatment of Uighurs, two issues on which Kazakhstan (and the Kyrgyz Republic) have since the mid-
1990s agreed to exercise restraint.  
43 The main caveat to this generalization is that intra-CIS trade continues to be treated differently; intra-
CIS trade tends to be freer than trade with non-CIS countries, and the internal free trade regime is 
especially true with respect to trade among Eurasian Economic Community members.  There have been 
exceptions when trade barriers have been imposed at internal CIS borders, but some of these measures 
have been temporary.  Having noted this element of hysteresis, however, it can be emphasized that 
positive steps to make internal free trade mandatory or to harmonize external trade policies have been 
practically fruitless.  
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matters have been dominant since 1999, and have entered the international spotlight 
since September 2001.  Trade facilitation, while more mundane, is an area in which 
progress could be made to reduce foregone opportunities for mutually beneficial trade 
(due to impediments such as unnecessary delays or bureaucracy at border crossings, 
and official or unofficial taxes on traders) and also to enable landlocked Central Asian 




All five of the Central Asian countries which became independent in late 1991 are 
economies for which primary product exports, and thus trade relations, are important.  
Although all declared their intention to participate in the global trading system they 
have, to varying degrees, pursued trade policies incompatible with WTO rules and 
have, with the exception of the Kyrgyz Republic, been cautious about accepting the 
obligations imposed by WTO membership.  At the same time they have all signed on 
to myriad regional agreements which might threaten adherence to the most-favoured 
nation principle at the heart of the WTO-based system. The failure of the many 
preferential trading agreements mooted since 1992 should have already clarified that 
they are not a practical route to realizing greater gains from trade. 
  The striking feature of the regional arrangements described in section 3 is the 
general lack of progress in establishing or implementing preferential trade policies.
44  
Despite many proposals for regional trading arrangements, in practice the Central 
Asian countries have in their trade policies clearly chosen the path of policy 
autonomy combined with non-discriminatory multilateralism.  Buying imports from 
the global least-cost supplier and selling exports in the best market makes 
considerable economic sense, and is supported by the failure of the many 
discriminatory trading arrangements in Latin America and Africa during the second 
half of the twentieth century (Pomfret, 1997/2001).  The success of the European 
Union is a red herring insofar as on the political level the EU has been the vehicle for 
closer political ties, whereas the Central Asian countries have broken earlier political 
ties and have no wish to compromise their political autonomy now, and on the 
economic level the least-cost EU producer’s price will generally be little different 
from the world price.
45 
  The positive feature of the Central Asian countries’ de facto multilateralism is 
that the region remains well-placed to take advantage of opportunities offered by 
China’s recent WTO accession and Russia’s imminent accession.  Central Asian 
countries which are or become WTO members will benefit from a rule-based 
environment in their trade with all neighbouring economies except Afghanistan, and 
rules which are generally the most desirable for small open economies.  The costs in 
terms of restrictions on import-substitution strategies and other anti-liberal trade 
policies and in terms of reduced potential for political grandstanding via economic 
proposals in regional fora are minor – and indeed the tying of governments’ hands in 
                                                   
44 Comments like “The heads of the CIS states have all met regularly, but the agreements drawn up at 
their meetings have had no real force” and “most of the employees of the CIS, who at one point 
numbered about 2,500, were essentially wasting their time” (Olcott, Aslund and Garnett, 1999, 3 and 
10) apply to all the organizations listed in Table 8. 
45 There are exceptions to this, eg. in agriculture and in clothing, but the EU appears willing to accept 
the trade diversion in these sectors.  Even allowing for such exceptions, the potential trade diversion 
associated with potential preferential trading arrangements among the Central Asian economies is 




such activities should benefit the countries’ citizens.  Additional benefits from WTO 
membership include a possible reform-reinforcing effect, as well as access to the 
WTO dispute resolution mechanism and the ability to join coalitions working towards 
reducing trade barriers facing important exports.  
Yet, there are benefits from regional cooperation in Central Asia, and if these 
could be realized that would help to defuse political tensions.  In water resource 
management the potential benefits are obvious and enormous.  In preventing terrorism 
the benefits from regional cooperation are real but may be being manipulated to 
restrict liberty.  Regional cooperation in trade facilitation and in transit arrangements 
could reduce the tragedy of the anti-commons, where people promoting self-interested 
goals are choking off trade that would be mutually beneficial.  This tragedy can be 
mitigated by government actions to discourage or regulate anti-social behaviour by 
local authorities, customs officials and others under their jurisdiction.  The national 
governments can also benefit by implementing policies to reduce other impediments 
to trade such as cumbersome visa regulations, poorly developed financial systems, 
and capricious changes in border crossings, but that requires an appreciation that 
many of the foregone trade opportunities represent win-win situations. 
What are the prospects for improved international economic relations in 
Central Asia during the first decade of the twenty-first century?  At the institutional 
level, existing regional organizations have been strengthened, at least on paper, as the 
Union of Five became the Eurasian Community, the Shanghai Forum became the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Central Asian Economic Community was 
succeeded by the Central Asian Cooperation Organization.  Whether the 
implementation ability of the new organizations will exceed that of their predecessors 
remains uncertain.  The events of September 2001 stimulated declarations of 
concerted action against terrorism, but the immediate consequence was to widen the 
fissure between the Eurasian Community members and the countries which are more 
sceptical about Russia’s role in the region.  Moreover, recent developments within the 
region, especially increased territorial disputes, are creating a climate which is 
inimical to cooperation.  Whether justified on security grounds or not, new border 
control measures are unpopular among the local populations who have no history of 
such restrictions, and as assertions of the new states’ territorial rights they augur 
poorly for inter-state cooperation. 
On the specific question of the choice between regionalism and 
multilateralism in trade relations, the verdict from Central Asia is clear-cut.  
Regionalism may appear attractive, but on deeper investigation preferential regional 
trading arrangements are unattractive.  Multilateralism formalized by WTO 
membership may look like an unattractive restriction on policy autonomy, but on 
deeper investigation is the best framework within which the Central Asian countries 





 Table 1: Total Exports and Imports, 1993-2002 (millions of US dollars). 
 
  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Exports                     
Kaz.  1,107  3,227  5,256  5,926  6,497  5,511  5,598  9,138  8,647  9,930 
KR  360  339  483  506  609  509  454  502  476  480 
Taj  350  492  749  772  803  597  689  784  652  537 
Tkm  561  1,163  1,881  1,693  751  594  1,187  2,505  1,132  1,219 
Uzb  693  1,991  2,718  2,620  2,896  2,310  1,963  2,135  2,028  1,900 
Imports                     
Kaz.  1,704  3,285  3,807  4,247  4,302  4,373  3,686  5,052  6,363  6,809 
KR  447  316  392  795  709  841  610  554  464  593 
Taj  532  547  810  668  750  711  663  675  688  705 
Tkm  586  904  1,364  1,313  1,228  1,007  1,478  1,788  1,558  1,432 
Uzb  918  2,455  3,030  4,854  4,538  2,931  2,481  2,078  2,303  2,370 
 






Table 2: Share of Exports and Imports with the CIS, 1991-9 (percentages) 
 
  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995 
  X  M  X  M  X  M  X  M  X  M 
Kazakhstan   91  86  88  94  84  90  58  61  53  69 
Kyrgyz Rep  97  80  94  96  88  91  66  66  66  68 
Tajikistan  78  82  80  90  53  62  19  43  34  59 
Turkmenistan  95  79  80  85  70  78  77  47  49  55 
Uzbekistan  84  82  83  86  74  81  62  54  39  41 
 
  1996  1997  1998  1999 
  X  M  X  M  X  M  X  M 
Kazakhstan  56  70  46  54  40  47     26  43 
Kyrgyz Rep  78  58  53  61  45  52  40  43 
Tajikistan  43  57  36  64  34  63  46  78 
Turkmenistan  68  30  60  55  26  47  na  na 
Uzbekistan  21  32  33  27  25  28  30  26 
 











Kazakhstan  7.9 
Kyrgyz Republic  5.2 
Tajikistan  8.3 
Turkmenistan  0.5 
Uzbekistan  19.0 
 




  Table 4: Status of WTO Accession Negotiations 
 
  Applied  Working Parties  Member 
Kazakhstan  January 1996  6 meetings 1997-2004
a   
Kyrgyz Rep.  1993    December 1998 
Tajikistan  May 2001  WP not yet met   
Turkmenistan  Not applied     
Uzbekistan  December 1994  1 meeting, July 2002   
       
China  1986    December 2001 
Russian Fed.  June 1993  19 meetings, 1995-2003
b   
 
Source: WTO website. 
Notes: a - Kazakhstan Working Parties met on 19-20 March 1997, 9 October 1997, 9 
October 1998, 13 July 2001, 15 July 2003, and 4 March 2004. 
   b -  Russian Working Parties met on 17-19 July 1995,  4-6 December 1995, 
30-31 May 1996, 15 October 1996, 15 April 1997, 9-10 December 1997, 29-
30 July 1998, 16-17 December 1998, 25-26 May 2000, 5 December 2000, 26-
27 January 2001, 26-27 June 2001, 23-24 January 2002, 25 April 2002, 20 




Table 5: Trade between Central Asia and China (in million US dollars) 
 
(a) Chinese Trade Statistics 
 
  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
  M  X  M  X  M  X  M  X  M  X 
Kaz  95  433  205  431  494  644  599  958  328  961 
KR  71  36  172  26  103  32  110  67  77  42 
Taj  11  9  11  8  2  6  7  10  5  5 
Tkm  12  3  10  2  7  2  12  4  31  1 
Uzb  62  140  58  32  27  13  39  12  51  8 
 
(b) Central Asian Trade Statistics 
 
  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
  M  X  M  X  M  X  M  X  M  X 
Kaz  47  442  51  382  82  473  154  670  169  656 
KR  32  32  44  16  37  25  37  44  49  19 
Taj  2  13  1  5  3  3  12  3  0  0 
Tkm  7  2  6  6  14  5  16  8  35*  1* 
Uzb*  68  127  64  29  30  12  43  11  56  7 
 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 
Notes: In both tables X = Central Asian exports to China, M = Central Asian imports 
from China. For Uzbekistan, all years, and Turkmenistan 2001 the data 
marked * are constructed from partner country records. 
 
 
Table 6: Stock of Foreign Direct Investment in 2002 (millions of US dollars) 
 
Kazakhstan  15,354 
Kyrgyz Republic  415 
Tajikistan  162 
Turkmenistan  1,163 
Uzbekistan  1,332 
 






Table 7: Trade between Central Asia and Russia (in million US dollars) 
 
(a) Russian Trade Statistics 
 
  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
  M  X  M  X  M  X  M  X  M  X 
Kaz  2472  2743  1881  1877  1222  1391  2246  2197  2544  1834 
KR  167  149  131  129  84  95  103  88  83  61 
Taj  90  97  77  59  66  111  56  237  69  129 
Tkm  265  156  94  43  60  77  130  473  139  39 
Uzb  875  1016  485  521  240  466  274  662  364  580 
 
(b) Central Asian Trade Statistics 
 
  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
  M  X  M  X  M  X  M  X  M  X 
Kaz  1969  2288  1712  1611  1351  1139  2460  1784  2891  1748 
KR  191  99  204  84  109  71  133  65  85  65 
Taj  115  63  102  48  92  115  105  259  129  105 
Tkm  164  57  132  29  167  44  255  1029  153*  35* 
Uzb*  962  923  533  474  264  423  302  602  400  527 
 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 
Notes: In both tables X = Central Asian exports to Russia, M = Central Asian imports 
from Russia. For Uzbekistan, all years, and Turkmenistan 2001 the data 




Table 8: Membership of Regional Agreements involving Central Asian Countries 
 
  CIS  Eurasian 
Com. 
UES  CACO  SPECA  ECO  SCO 
Kazakhstan  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
Kyrgyz Rep  x  x    x  x  x  x 
Tajikistan  x  x    x  x  x  x 
Turkmenistan  x        x  x   
Uzbekistan  x      x  x  x  x 
Russia  x  x  x        x 
China              x 
Iran            x   
Pakistan            x   
Turkey            x   
Afghanistan            x   
Azerbaijan  x          x   
Armenia  x             
Belarus  x  x  x         
Georgia  x             
Moldova  x             
Ukraine  x    x         
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